A diagnostic illusory? The case of distinguishing between 'vegetative' and 'minimally conscious' states by Nettleton, Sarah et al.
A diagnostic illusory? The case of distinguishing between “vegetative”
and “minimally conscious” states
Sarah Nettleton a, *, Jenny Kitzinger b, Celia Kitzinger a
a Department of Sociology, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK
b School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, Cardiff University, Bute Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff, CF10 3NB, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 9 December 2013
Received in revised form
11 June 2014
Accepted 23 June 2014
Available online 27 June 2014
Keywords:
Ambivalence
Diagnosis
Qualitative
Minimally conscious state
Vegetative
a b s t r a c t
Throughout afﬂuent societies there are growing numbers of people who survive severe brain injuries
only to be left with long-term chronic disorders of consciousness. This patient group who exist betwixt
and between life and death are variously diagnosed as in ‘comatose’, ‘vegetative’, and, more recently,
‘minimally conscious’ states. Drawing on a nascent body of sociological work in this ﬁeld and de-
velopments in the sociology of diagnosis in concert with Bauman's thesis of ‘ambivalence’ and Turner's
work on ‘liminality’, this article proposes a concept we label as diagnostic illusory in order to capture the
ambiguities, nuanced complexities and tensions that the biomedical imperative to name and classify
these patients give rise to. Our concept emerged through a reading of debates within medical journals
alongside an analysis of qualitative data generated by way of a study of accounts of those close to pa-
tients: primarily relatives (N ¼ 51); neurologists (N ¼ 4); lawyers (N ¼ 2); and others (N ¼ 5) involved in
their health care in the UK.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
This article seeks to propose a novel concepte diagnostic illusory
e in order to capture the ambiguities and nuanced complexities
associated with the biomedical imperative to name and classify. We
suggest that diagnosis is something of amodernist notion, rooted in
the idea that we can have bounded, stable and more precise diag-
nostic categories identiﬁed by increasingly sophisticated technol-
ogies. In more and more areas of medicine e for example, breast
cancer (Curtis et al., 2012) and dementia (Richards and Brayne,
2010) e we are witnessing the sub-categorization of diagnoses,
and although sociologists have demonstrated the unstable nature
of diagnostic categories (Mol, 2002; Buscher et al., 2010), the lure of
technological innovations in, for instance, genetics and neurosci-
ence, that offer the promise of greater diagnostic precision remains
strong (Borup et al., 2006). However, such diagnostic ﬁne-tuning
may, rather ironically, harbour unintended consequences; the
imperative for diagnostic conviction could generate as many
anomalies as it seeks to resolve. Moreover, diagnostic certainty
could, in some instances, exacerbate existential doubt.
To ground this theorization we draw on empirical research into
chronic disorders of consciousness (CDoCs) and in particular the
circumstances of patients who have survived severe brain injury
yet remain in long-term vegetative or minimally conscious states.
The study provides a window through which we might understand
this contemporary trend within medicine. It was through the
analysis of our data, informed by insights from the sociology of
diagnosis, that our concept took shape. We begin by introducing
the extant literature on the sociology of (what are loosely and
controversially called) ‘vegetative’ states and the sociology of
diagnosis. We then introduce diagnostic categories applied in the
context of CDoCs focusing on the distinction between vegetative
states (VS) and minimally conscious states (MCS), outline their
prognostic, legal, and social consequences and explore debates
within the associated biomedical literatures. Turning to our
empirical material we reveal conundrums associated with the
determination of consciousness found amongst the views of rela-
tives, carers and clinical practitioners. Drawing on concepts of
ambivalence (Bauman, 1991) and liminality (Turner, 1967) we
conclude with a discussion on the ways in which a biomedical
ontology of ‘consciousness’ reiﬁes its existence as a ‘thing’ (Taussig,
1980) that can be detected and ‘seen’within the brain, and how this
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in turn generates ambiguities for those who care for and care about
these patients.
1.1. Sociology of chronic disorders of consciousness
The survival of patients who have sustained severe brain in-
juries and who are (at least initially) unable to breathe or swallow
is a recent phenomenon. Forty years ago they would have died
relatively quickly. In many afﬂuent societies, as the result of
technologies such as, mechanical ventilators and improvements in
the clinical delivery of nutrition and hydration, in concert with a
medico-legal imperative to preserve life, a growing number of
patients with CDoC survive for years and sometimes decades. Ar-
ticles report on the reactions of care givers and the socio-legal and
ethical implications of their views (Kuehlmeyer et al., 2012;
Samuel and Kitzinger, 2013; Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2013;
Halliday et al., 2014), however as yet, there is only a small litera-
ture on their conceptual signiﬁcance (Ben-David and Israeli, 2010;
Kaufman, 2003, 2005) and it is with these theoretical contribu-
tions that we seek to engage. From these, and related studies on
‘brain death’ (Giacomini, 1997; Lock, 2002; Kaufman and Morgan,
2005), it is evident that professionals, families and wider publics
struggle to make sense of patients who are neither fully ‘alive’ nor
unambiguously ‘dead’. Kaufman's (2005) ethnography of North
American hospital units where health workers and relatives care
for patients in ‘vegetative states’ is instructive. She demonstrates
how this growing patient population trouble ontologies of life and
death, and challenge Western notions of personhood. New cate-
gories of patients in the uncharted territory betwixt and between
life and death exist in what Kaufman calls the ‘gray zone’, that is
‘… states of being that are neither “comatose” nor “awake” or
“alert,” taken together, have created zones of indistinction’
(Kaufman, 2005: 62).
Timmermans' (2005) concept of ‘death brokering’ is also useful
here, since it captures the ways in which medical experts work to
make these, and other ever more diversiﬁed modes of allowing or
delaying death, meaningful. Health professionals:
‘offer increasingly ﬂexible cultural scripts to render the end-of-
life socially meaningful while accentuating death's existential
ambiguity. Medical professionals help to create the ambiguity
they promise to resolve, reinforcing the cultural need for more
expert death brokering’ (p. 993).
Attempts to further demarcate and categorize ‘anomalous’ patients
within the ‘grey zone’ provide one such example of medical efforts
to ‘resolve’ ambiguities. Indeed, since Kaufman carried out her
ﬁeldwork in the 1990s, a new label has been applied to those who
are neither ‘vegetative’ nor fully ‘conscious’ but ‘minimally
conscious’ (Giacino et al., 2002). In this liminal landscape diagnostic
categories are currently in the making (see RCP, 2013). Thus turning
the sociological lens on to these processes is timely.
1.2. Sociology of diagnosis
The subﬁeld ‘sociology of diagnosis’ (Jutel, 2011; McGann and
Hutson, 2011) urges us to ‘see diagnosis as a kind of focal point
where numerous interests, anxieties, values, knowledge, practices
and other factors merge and converge’ (Jutel and Nettleton, 2011:
798). Diagnosis is at once a category and a process (Blaxter, 1978)
that carries social, moral, economic, political as well as prognostic
consequences. Diagnosis is a noun, a label that can serve as an
apparently stable descriptor of a discrete condition. But diagnosis is
also a verb that implies the act of diagnosing and is deeply
embedded in our notions of medical work. As Rosenberg (2002)
argues, diagnosis throughout the 20th century came to be
understood as objective descriptor of a disease that, in turn, had a
correspondent pathological lesion. Diseases and diagnoses he
writes became ‘entities existing outside the unique manifestations
of illness in particular men and women’ (p. 237). Once encoded in
classiﬁcatory systems such as the International Classiﬁcation of
Diseases (ICD), a diagnosis feeds back into the diagnostic process
(Hacking, 1999). The process is dialectical; clinically accepted
diagnostic categories found in medical texts and diagnostic man-
uals inform day to day diagnostic work within the clinic and vice
versa. The diagnostic categories of, and diagnostic ‘work’ associated
with, VS andMCS should therefore be understood as an amalgam of
practices that circulate throughout medical texts, scientists, clinical
practitioners, relatives, bureaucrats, and patients (cf Foucault,1980;
Buscher et al. 2010; Mesman, 2008). As such it is a worthwhile line
of inquiry and one we follow in our analysis of the contemporary
concretization of VS and MCS. We explore what Bowker and Star
(2000: 44) refer to as the ‘practical politics of classifying.’
‘Someone, somewhere, must decide and argue over the minu-
tiae of classifying and standardizing. The negotiations them-
selves form the basis for a fascinating practical ontology e our
favorite example is when is someone really alive? Is it breathing,
attempts at breathing, or movement? How long must each of
those last? Whose voice will determine the outcome is some-
times an exercise of pure power’.
The implication here is that determining evidence of ‘life’ and
‘death’ is (at the risk of understatement) difﬁcult. Our attention is
on the relatively new landscape of ‘death in life’ (Kaufman, 2005: 7)
where the determination of consciousness within these border-
lands has come to carry signiﬁcant prognostic, legal, ethical and
social consequences.
1.3. MCS and VS: categories and consequences
In the UK, a VS is formally deﬁned in guidelines (RCP, 2013) as
‘permanent’ [PVS] a year after traumatic and six months after non-
traumatic brain injury (in the USA the equivalent time after non-
traumatic injury is three months). The diagnostic label ‘minimally
conscious state’ (MCS) was ‘invented’ in 2002 by neurologists in the
USA who sought to label a subgroup patients, who did not ‘ﬁt’ the
criteria of the VS, precisely because they appeared to manifest
awareness, albeit at a low level and intermittently (Giacino et al.,
2002). Formally described as ‘minimally responsive states’, the
semantic shift from ‘responsiveness’ to ‘consciousness’ is signiﬁ-
cant because of the socio-cultural resonances and because it serves
to contribute to the reiﬁcation of ‘consciousness’ as a ‘thing’
(Taussig, 1980).
Attempting to assess whether the patient is in a VS or MCS is
relatively routine in practice across ‘the West.’ There are calls to
subdivide the MCS diagnostic category still further. Bruno et al.
(2011) propose sub-categorization into minimally conscious PLUS
(MCSþ) and minimally conscious MINUS (MCS#) to reﬂect degrees
of complexity of observed behavioral responses. MCS# is deﬁned as
closer to the ‘vegetative’ state e a state also referred to as ‘unre-
sponsive wakefulness syndrome’ (UWS) (Laureys et al., 2010) to
avoid the negative connotations of ‘vegetative’, and allow for the
possibility that unresponsive patients may have some level of
awareness albeit inaccessible during clinical observations.
Current clinical assessment in the UK predominantly relies on
two tools: the Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM) and the Sensory
Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique (SMART).
Diagnosis based on the latter is now required in English court cases
for treatment withdrawal. SMART is a formal assessment con-
ducted in ten sessions over a three week period and is designed to
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provide the opportunity for patients to exhibit their full behavioral
repertoire in each sensory modality. A range of standardized
auditory stimuli is presented, including loud sound, voice and
verbal instructions. Patients are scored at one of ﬁve levels for each
modality, from “no response” or “reﬂex response” at the lower end
of awareness to “differentiating response” at level ﬁve at which a
patient may follow instructions or use an object (e.g. a pen)
appropriately. The ability of these assessment tools to determine
awareness is contested with claims that there are high levels of
misdiagnosis (Andrews et al., 1996; Gill-Thwaites, 2004). Studies
assess their relative ‘accuracy’; for example Schnakers et al. (2009)
report that the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) found the
proportion of patients diagnosed with MCS by the CRS-R was
signiﬁcantly higher compared to other neurobehavioral scales such
as, the ‘Glasgow Coma Scale’, the ‘Full Outline of UnResponsiveness’
and the ‘WHIM’. The relative merits of these scales are outwith the
scope of this paper. What is important to note however, is that
these clinical tools take behavioral responsiveness to be a proxy for
consciousness. By contrast, recent diagnostic techniques that use
imaging technologies presume that evidence of consciousness is to
be found within the brain.
There is a growing body of work in neuroscience that advances
imaging technologies as a means of providing tangible evidence of
consciousness, which have the potential to overcome the vagaries
of behavioral assessments (Brukamp, 2013). Monti et al. (2010)
point to the way that current assessments based on clinical his-
tories rely on ‘subjective observation’ of ‘patient's spontaneous and
elicited behaviour’.
‘Differentiating between awareness and non-awareness ulti-
mately relies on a pragmatic principle that someone is conscious
if they can indicate so’ (Monti et al., 2010: 294).
This difﬁculty, it is argued, can be compounded by patients'
sensory or auditory impairments that might mask awareness,
and by the ‘intermittent’ nature of the consciousness of some
brain injured patients (Monti et al., 2010: 293). While the merits
and demerits of the technologies are hotly debated, there is
nevertheless a strong thread that points to the brain as a locus of
consciousness and a drive towards the view that functional
neuroimaging (fMRI) and/or cerebral F-ﬂuorodeoxyglucose (FDG)
positron emission tomography (PET) has the potential to deter-
mine awareness (Owen et al., 2006; Von Wild et al., 2012;
Stender et al., 2014). One team of researchers writing in Neuro-
Rehabilitation posit that the ‘absence of (behavioral) proof of
consciousness is not absolute proof of absence of consciousness’
(Grosseries et al., 2011: 5); moreover neuroimaging studies have
‘demonstrated that a small subset of unresponsive “vegetative”
patients may show unambiguous signs of consciousness and
command following [which are] inaccessible to bedside clinical
examination’ (Grosseries et al., 2011: 9 italics our emphasis). To be
sure, developments in this ﬁeld are evolving rapidly with claims
and counterclaims on the feasibility and use of these technolo-
gies (Coleman et al., 2009; Jox and Kuehlmeyer, 2013; Turner-
Stokes et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a sociological reading might
lead us to question whether this aspiration to diagnostic ‘accu-
racy’ runs the risk of bracketing out the nuanced issues that
surround understandings of consciousness and so reify ‘it’ as a
‘thing’ that can be ‘seen’ through increasingly high-tech ‘reso-
lutions’ (Cohn, 2004). This is salient in a wider context wherein
there is a growing media interest in, and popular appetite for,
neuroscientiﬁc explanations of disease, health, and indeed life
(Racine et al., 2010). It is also important because diagnostic
certitude can be consequential: prognostically, legally, ethically,
and socially.
Placing patients on either side of the VS/MCS binary has im-
plications for anticipated outcomes, treatments and care. MCS pa-
tients are eligible for rehabilitation therapies and pain medication
regimens that may not be considered appropriate for those classi-
ﬁed as VS. Legally, patients diagnosed as PVS, if approved by the
courts, may be allowed to die through the withdrawal of artiﬁcial
nutrition and hydration (ANH). By contrast (in the UK), this has
never been approved for patients diagnosed as MCS (Huxtable,
2013). In England, there has been only one case of a patient diag-
nosed as MCS brought to court for authorization of withdrawal of
ANH: the Court of Protection ruled that withdrawal would be un-
lawful (W v. M EWHC 2443 (Fam). 2011). It was judged that ‘the
importance of preserving life is the decisive factor in this case’ (ibid
e paragraph 249). Despite so much resting on these diagnostic
categorizations closer analysis of the views of relatives and clini-
cians reveals that diagnostic clarity in practice is far from
straightforward and fails to resolve ambiguities and does not
address their quest for meaning. We expand on these issues below
following a description of our study and methods.
2. Study and methods
The empirical research reported here is part of an ongoing
interdisciplinary project that comprises reviews of documentary
sources such as: biomedical literatures, legal judgments, and media
reports, and qualitative interviews undertaken with 51 relatives of
patients who are (or were) in a CDoC, four neurologists, two law-
yers and ﬁve other relevant professionals (e.g. a care homemanager
and a physiotherapist). Research ethics committees at the Univer-
sities of York and Cardiff approved the study, as did the NHS (NHS
REC reference number: 12/SC/0495).
Relatives were recruited through advertising via brain-injury
support groups, care homes and websites and through contacts
following formal presentations about the research. They vary in
terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status, as do
the patients. All participants were interviewed by either the sec-
ond or the third author, and were mostly one-to-one, but occa-
sionally in pairs. Interviewees were mostly parents, siblings,
spouses⁄partners and adult children of the patient. Most patients
were currently formally identiﬁed as either VS or MCS (some had
died by the time of interview; others had emerged with severe
neurological deﬁcits). The topic guide was ﬂexible to allow people
to tell their stories. Interviews usually lasted between two and four
hours. Pseudonyms are used throughout. Interview transcriptions
were discussed by the research team, coded to facilitate retrieval
and to help identify themes. Issues pertaining to diagnosis were
coded e.g. disclosure of diagnosis, diagnostic terms, references to
diagnostic criteria (e.g. eyes, interpretation of bodily movements
and so on).
Our analytic strategy was also to ‘use the data think with’
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 163) and to reﬂect sociologically
on the assumptions and interpretations that circulate in relation to
the newly emerging categorizations of VS and MCSs. Our analytic
orientation is informed by Bird-David and Israeli's (2010) relational
approach and presumes that patients as persons may be con-
structed through interactions with those around them. Moreover,
we work on the presumption that patients who have limited or no
consciousness are agential in the sense that they invoke responses
in people and things that surround them. It is to these responses
and search for meanings to which we now turn.
3. Determining consciousness: but what does it mean?
As we have seen within the neuroscience literature there are
researchers who point to the limitations of clinical assessment tools
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for the diagnosis of VS and MCS, and who advance the potential of
imaging technologies (Sleigh andWarnaby, 2014). Such debates are
not unique to the study of CDoCs and these technologies have been
studied by sociologists in other medical settings, who document
how the images are open to multiple interpretations even amongst
those working within the same medical specialty (Dumit, 1999;
Joyce, 2008). Such issues are pertinent here, but in our particular
case there are further complications. The fact that fMRIs are rarely
practicable for many VS and MCS patients (because their bodies are
mobile and the technology requires that them to be motionless) is
signiﬁcant, but more salient for our thesis is the metaphysical
problem as to what visualizations of the brain actually mean and
the lack of ontological consensus about what fMRI reveals. What is
consciousness? Can it be detected in blood ﬂow in the brain?
Commenting on the scope of fMRI to determine consciousness one
neurologist said in interview, ‘at the moment we have no idea of
what it really means. We don't know whether it really means
they're aware’. He reﬂects further on this.
‘How is it possible to breathe if you have nil awareness? I think
philosophers and neuroscientists have not yet solved the
problem of: ‘What is consciousness?’ And if they haven't solved
it after hundreds of hours and papers, then I'm not going to solve
it [laughs] and I have to take a rather more pragmatic view and
my bottom line thinking is the question: Have they extracted
meaning and/or have they demonstrated some goal-directed
activity? You ask about doubt e and I suppose the only other
area where I have doubt e which is more an in-principle doubt
than it is a doubt on an individual patient basis e is that it is at
least plausible, I presume, given that that we have low aware-
ness states and given that we know, in low awareness states,
they're often only aware for short periods of time, how do I
know that this person, who has been tested as being unre-
sponsive, doesn't have a microsecond of being aware? A
microsecond. I couldn't possibly tell. What about a second? I
couldn't tell that either. I'd need at least two minutes awareness
to be certain that they're aware’.
Echoing this neurologist, Neil, whose son was diagnosed as VS,
an ofﬁcial diagnosis he ‘accepts’, struggles to make sense of the
metaphysics of life without consciousness.
‘What is a vegetative state? That's never been explained. We've
had it up on the computer, but that's still never, ever been
explained to us. You know, what a patient in a vegetative state
goes through, sees, hears. I mean surely they must hear some-
thing, they must see something, or do they just not? If that's the
case, then they're blind, deaf and they're just lying there aren't
they? […] I mean surely his mind must recognize something. I
mean I ﬁnd it absolutely impossible, God in heaven, that your
mind doesn't recognize something. I mean e But if they're
saying he doesn't, then he doesn't’.
Thus Neil at the same time as he accepts the validity of the VS
diagnosis ﬁnds it ontologically perplexing (‘absolutely impossible’).
This ambiguity is evident in other areas of medicine where medical
diagnoses and explanations are ‘accepted’ and yet remain incom-
prehensible at the level of meaning. Comaroff and Maguire (1981)
found that parents of children with leukemia understood the
diagnosis but also found it perplexing at the level of meaning. They
argue that, ‘medicine can be seen as ambiguous in a double sense:
the more it appears to control, the more threatening is the domain
where knowledge is still lacking; and themore it controls, the more
alienated the layman himself from control over its effects’ (1981 p.
115). Indeed, as discussed above clinical scripts can generate as
many questions as they resolve and so exacerbate ‘existential am-
biguity’ (Timmermans, 2005). So for Neil to see his son ‘alive’
without consciousness is difﬁcult to comprehend and he ﬁnds
himself in the midst of a ‘cultural remapping of notions of “life” and
“persons”’ (Kaufman 2000: 70), experiencing a disturbing mixture
of what Kaufman calls ‘death within life’ which constitutes an
archetypical liminality as described by Turner (1967). Liminality is a
transient zone characterized by an absence of familiar norms and a
destabilization of received notions of personhood. Social mores and
prescriptions are suspended and routine interactions dissolve into
confusion. Patients in a PVS are not experienced by their relatives as
unequivocally ‘alive’ or unequivocally ‘dead’ (Holland et al., 2014)
and they struggle to make sense of this. Indeed, the process re-
quires a gestalt shift even in terms of our mundane, ingrained
readings and interpretations of the human body and its
movements.
3.1. Reading bodily movements or embodied actions
Listening to relatives' accounts it is evident that routine ways of
interpreting bodilymovements were bewildering. How they should
‘read’ the patient's body? How should they interpret the move-
ments of their son, daughter, mother, partner, or spouse? How, or
can, they distinguish between ‘movements’ and ‘actions’, or be-
tween ‘reﬂexes’ and ‘embodied reactions’? From a clinical
perspective, in the days or weeks after severe brain injury, patients
are diagnosed as comatose: they have their eyes closed and do not
manifest sleep-wake cycles (Laureys, 2007). The move from coma
to a VS is marked by eye-opening and the onset of sleep-wake
cycles. In our everyday lives (and in media representations of
coma) eye opening tends to be associated with ‘waking up’ and for
many participants is a signiﬁcant moment. Belinda, describes how
her son (diagnosed as VS) would apparently respond to her in the
ﬁrst few months after his injury:
‘He would open his right eye, the side he was hit on. The left eye
was still badly bruised and not open. It was months before that
opened but his right eye would open. I would come in the room,
I would go ‘Hi darling, Mum and Dad are here!’ And we'd get a
response. […] He must've known I was theree or was that just a
ﬂuke, wish we knew. I don't know. […] I can't say he's
completely brain dead because I don't know if he is. If he can sit
in a chair with his eyes open, if he can be put to bed and shut his
eyes, something's making him do that.’
Belinda (like Neil) ‘accepts’ the VS diagnosis, which by deﬁnition
rules out the possibility of consciousness, yet there are hints of
uncertainty. Ofﬁcially her son has no awareness and yet the
comment ‘he must've have known I was there’ suggests the con-
trary. Furthermore an apparently illusive ‘something’ making him
act/move alludes to amysterious corporeal or extracorporeal realm.
Hesitation and self-questioning in such reﬂections in the interviews
is endemice ‘was that just a ﬂuke’e like Neil she does not know for
sure.
Hannah gives a rather different account of the ﬁrst time she saw
Williamwith his eyes open, around a month after the precipitating
event. She describes it as ‘actually quite distressing’.
‘I went in, and there he was with his eyes open. And I went
around e he was looking out the window, so I stood looking at
him, I said, “William, it's Hannah”. And nothing. He just stared.
He wasn't even focusing on anything, you know. Not like say if
there was an animal there, and you look at the animal, the an-
imal looks at you, and there's that, you know. But there was
nothing’.
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She recalls how a doctor had said to her that: ‘”it's like a spon-
taneous thing. He's not, you know, he's sort of looking but he's not
seeing. We don't really think that it's of any signiﬁcance as such.”’
Thus the opened eyes, the doctor explained, were not evidence of
awareness, or at least ‘we don't really think it's of any signiﬁcance.’
This is a neat illustration of theway inwhich, withinmodern health
care systems, it is the medical profession who prescribe how we
should read bodies. In this instance, such a reading was congruent
with Hannah's and useful for the family because it reinforced a PVS
diagnosis critical for the application to the courts for treatment
withdrawal.
When Harry and Natalie (interviewed as a couple) talked about
Harry's sister Zoe they were clear that she should be allowed to die,
a position that they had come to over some years. They, like other
relatives, struggle to make sense of events and although they felt
sure they now know what to do for the best, this was far from
straightforward. In this sense relatives resemble the ‘moral pio-
neers’ that Rapp (2000) has written about in the context women
undergoing tests for amniocentesis. The technological affordances
at the margins of birth and life give rise to circumstances wherein
women ‘are forced to judge the quality of their own fetuses, making
concrete and embodied decisions about the standards for entry into
the human community’ (p3). Similarly, the technological affor-
dances that place those who are alive in circumstances where the
person may no longer be ‘living’ provoke comparable moral
quandaries which take time to work through, as is evident in
following exchange.
Natalie: So I mean that is a difﬁculty. That's a hurdle we've got to
get over. What we are convinced about is that from everything
that we can ﬁnd out, it is not in Zoe's best interest to be still alive
because she's existing. She isn't living.
Harry: I mean there's a line where it says clinicians are good at
ﬁxing bodies but they're not good at ﬁxing brains. [Interviewer:
Yeah. You've said she's existing, not living, and I think you said
earlier that the Zoe you knew ‘died’ four years ago] Harry: She
did, yeah.
Later Harry adds more poetically:
The body's like a ﬂower. It withers and it's gone, you know.
That's what's happening. A beautiful ﬂower is withering and is
going. It's just, you know, there's nothing more that can be said
really. It's gone through e gone through that phase and that's it.
Conversely for relatives who want to support life and prevent
death, a MCS diagnosis may bring relief. Currently this diagnosis
(probably) removes the threat that the patient could be allowed to
die by withdrawal of ANH and broadens the scope of rehabilitation.
For these relatives the patient remains alive as is evidenced by
indicators of intentionality and awareness within the anatomical
frame.
Returning to the issue of eye opening, Stavros, like Hannah,
recalled the day his brother ﬁrst opened his eyes, but in contrast to
Hannah, he imputes intentionality. Where Hannah had reported
that ‘there was nothing’, Stavros comments ‘he looks at you’ and
‘there was something there’. Moreover his narrative structure im-
plies the causal signiﬁcance of his mother's visit and his brother's
intentionality:
‘She sang to him, you know, cried a lot. Anyway, the very next
day, Len opened his eyes wide open for the ﬁrst time. Properly
kept them open. Then I knew that he wanted to live. That was
the instrumental thing that made me think, ‘he wants to live’,
you know. And it was sort of a steady improvement. Even the
doctors said that he might be a vegetable, blah, blah, blah, but
you can see theway he looks at you. Tome, hewasn't a person in
a vegetative state. There was something there’.
In keeping with our relational analytic approach we can see the
agential signiﬁcance of the patient's body and helps us appreciate
why diagnostic decisions are not always shared. For example,
Stavros notes the doctors had at that stage classiﬁed Len as
‘potentially a vegetable’, however he is clear about his view as to
Len's awareness: he ‘wanted to live’. Siobhan's account of her
‘interaction’ with her husband similarly enacted him as a knowing
person.
‘Hewill always react when I come in and in fact yesterday I think
I got a smile for the very ﬁrst time in ten months. I went in, “So
how are you sweetheart? How's it going?” Just as I normally do,
and he turned his head as he always does and hemade this facial
expression. And now Bob is not a smiler (laughs) he's not a
smiley person, you know. And I got this expression and I mean
it's the ﬁrst time I could actually say he smiled at me.’
Thus smiling, eye opening, head turning, and hand grasping can
be accepted by relatives as consistent with VS but may belie other
contrasting yet simultaneous interpretations. People hold multiple,
shifting and what might seem, on a superﬁcial level, contradictory
views about presence of consciousness. Views are rarely static
especially as relatives researched information on CDoC, discussed
their views, reﬂected on the possible outcomes, and as the patient's
body changed over time. A nuanced appreciation of the way rela-
tives can hold inconsistent thoughts contrasts with the view of
some clinicians who imply that relatives' ideas are sometimes
borne of ignorance. Some claim that relatives are inclined to
interpret head turns and hand grasps as intentional because they
‘misunderstand’ that such movements are congruent with an
absence of consciousness (Majerus et al., 2005). Our data point to a
more subtle process where relatives are working to make onto-
logical and epistemological sense of the conundrums found within
this unique liminality.
These ambivalences point to the scope for tensions that can, and
inevitably will, permeate communication between relatives and
clinicians. Relatives sometimes described their anger towards
health professionals who they felt had acted insensitively. Some
recounted conﬂicts that had been played out in consultations and in
what are known as ‘best interest’ meetings where care plans are
explored. Frustrations were also reported about the adequacy of
‘expert’ assessments carried out by neurologists who had been
insufﬁciently thorough, and/or had failed to give sufﬁcient
consideration to the fact that it was relatives who knew what pa-
tients would have wanted. Such tensions are perhaps inevitable
given the life-transformative circumstances and where a diagnosis
of PVS and MCS is so important in relation to decisions about care
plans, insurance, resources and the possibility of treatment with-
drawal. Thus there is an imperative to determine a deﬁnitive
diagnosis to facilitate decision-making and some degree of reso-
lution, and yet at the same time diagnostic processes and outcomes
are mired with ambiguity and ambivalence.
4. Ambiguity, ambivalance and the ‘diagnostic illusory’
Our analysis reveals just how taxing attempts to determine
the presence of consciousness can be, not least because we have
little in the way of shared understanding as to what conscious-
ness ‘is’, the means of identiﬁcation are contested and a diagnosis
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of VS or MCS is so consequential. All this takes place in the
context of emotionally shattering circumstances where families
experience the ‘loss’ of a loved one to a novel liminal landscape
(Turner, 1967) of which most people have no prior experience. As
we have seen, over the last few decades there have been at-
tempts to bring order to this zone by classifying patients within
in ever more complex grids e to label them as MCS, MCSþ, MCS-,
Persistent VS, Permanent VS, unresponsive wakefulness syn-
drome (UWS) and so on. Arguably this objective to establish ever
more discrete diagnostic categories is an inherently modernist
phenomenon and brings unintended consequences. It is
emblematic of the ‘tyranny of diagnosis’ that Rosenberg (2002)
writes about e whereby diagnostic categories have become
rooted within the anatomical frame to the exclusion of the per-
son or place. In medical specialties such as neurology and psy-
chiatry, such technologies have meant that conditions previously
identiﬁed by behavioral symptoms ‘are potentially being re-
assigned as brain disorders that can be isolated in the body’
(Cohn, 2010: 66). Lock (2001) argues that the brain, more than
any other anatomical organ, is becoming synonymous with ‘life’.
This observation that there is a prevailing view of a correlative
relation between consciousness and the brain is a ‘new thought
style’ Fleck (1935) emerging from neuroscience and is perme-
ating other discourses. Sociologists point to the ubiquity of
neuroscientiﬁc theories of biological consciousness (Cohn, 2004;
Buchman et al., 2013; Pickersgill, 2013) which are pervasive not
only in academic circles but also in popular discourses where
there is a media appetite for, and public receptivity to, them
(Williams, 2009; Nufﬁeld, 2013). An implicit credence is given to
the view ‘that consciousness was merely an object lying in wait
for these new technological techniques, and so disguise the very
fact that they have been increasingly subjected to cultural and
historical modiﬁcation’ (Cohn, 2004: 58).
Thus the calls within the neuroscience literature to move
beyond clinical evaluations of patients with CDoC based on ‘be-
haviours’ (Owen, 2008) and invest instead in ‘state-of-the-art
neuroimaging methods in the assessment of patients’ (Owen and
Coleman, 2008: 235) have the potential to garner support
amongst relatives and wider publics. However tantalizing more
precise diagnostic categorizations rooted in the depths of the brain
may be, sociological studies of other related high tech innovations
suggest that such aspirations to conﬁrm an ‘aware’ person, may be
illusory. As Cohn (2004) elegantly argues
‘The illusion is simple: the brain has long since been the locus of
various surface knowledges that up until recently have devel-
oped relatively independently. But the functional brain image
holds the promise of establishing a renewed conﬁdence in both
depth and uniﬁcation towards a science of consciousness itself.
Thus, the claim, described earlier, that this is the birth of a meta-
science of the brain is itself embodied in the very focus upon
what is seen as the essence of the corporeal person’ (2004: 60).
These technologies are indicative of a privileged biomedical
ontology of consciousness only accessible to neurobiologists. A
corollary may be that alternative framings, such as, relatives' views
as to what patients may have wanted, or relatives' readings of
bodily movements become relegated within the diagnostic
process.
Bauman's (1991) notion of ambivalence provides further analytic
purchase here, and may help us make some sociological sense of
the anxieties that categorical diagnostic imperatives give rise to.
‘Ambivalence is a side product of the labor of classiﬁcation; and
it calls for yet more classifying effort. Though born of the
naming/classifying urge, ambivalencemay be fought only with a
naming that is yet more exact, and classes that are yet more
precisely deﬁned: that is, with such operations as will set still
together (counter-factual) demands on the discreteness and
transparency of the world and thus give yet more occasion for
ambiguity. The struggle against ambivalence is, therefore, both
self destructive and self propelling’ (1991: 3).
In sum, the more we try to name and classify the more confused
we become; themore confusedwe are themorewe try to classify in
order tomanage, control, and decidewhat is to be done for the best.
The problem is circular, and especially pertinent for a population
who are alive and (possibly) conscious. Even in cases where di-
agnoses are made the circumstances still demand ‘cultural scripts’
and modes of ‘death brokering’ as ‘the postponement of death
again carries its own existential ambiguity and anguish because it is
expressed in risk factors that offer probabilities but no guaranteed
results’ (Timmermans, 2005, 1007). Survivors of severe brain injury
are emblematic of processes described by Timmermans:
‘Death brokering thus contains a self-fulﬁlling principle: medi-
cal practitioners deﬁne problems and offer solutions that never
completely address the problems or raise new issues, under-
scoring the need for further expert involvement in the end-of-
life. Medical death brokering rests on the hope that with more
professional involvement dying will be improved and deaths
have not been in vain’ (2005: 995).
Certainly, there is a proliferation of experts who orbit these
patients such as; GPs, neurologists, nurses, scientists, lawyers, and
rehabilitation specialists who engage with carers and relatives
who, in turn, bring their own expertise. Each draw upon multiple
sources of knowledge and empirical observations in order to better
understand patients and grapple with the ‘existential ambiguity’
that the possibility, proximity and postponement of death brings
(Timmermans, 2005: 993). In this respect, we can see how the
creation of theMCS category in 2002 adds to these ambiguities, and
is consistent with Baumen's theorization that the biomedical
‘naming/classifying urge’ in tandemwith increasingly sophisticated
diagnostic biotechnologies conspire (despite the best of intentions)
to amplify ambivalence.
Thus the attempt to ﬁrm up diagnostic categories, to place and
to name, may be a diagnostic illusory. The apparent stability of
diagnosis not only belies its inherent instability, but a diagnosis
may also fail to attend to meanings inherent in illness, life and
death. As we have seen even when doctors, relatives, and lawyers
agree on, or accept, a diagnosis of either VS or MCS there is a
lingering omnipresence of ‘existential ambiguity’. Uncertainty and
the search for meaning are unlikely to be dispelled as a result of
imagings of consciousness because, as our participants ask: ‘what
does it mean?”. Furthermore, sociological research indicates that
diagnostic categories are rarely stable. Take Mol's (2002)
ethnography of the diagnosis of atherosclerosis where she
shows how the body is ‘enacted’ from varying perspectives and
diagnosis is a ‘patchwork singularity’: a temporary stitching
together of multiple enactments. In practice classiﬁcations are
rarely tidy, consensual and ﬁxed. Their ﬂuidity is shaped too by
decisions beyond the clinic. For example, recent court judgments
in England have supported doctors' rights to withhold treatments
such as cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, vasopressor drugs and
renal replacement therapy from MCS patients (Aintree University
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67) even
when the judge accepts a family's testimony that the patient
himself would want them to sustain his life in MCS as long as
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possible and would see his own suffering as bringing him closer to
God (www.theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/13/family-muslim-
lose-right-to-life-case-god).
In sum, we suggest that there is an increasingly pervasive
biomedical view that consciousness is a ‘thing’ (Taussig, 1980)
laying latent but as yet unseen. Some neuroscientists (Grosseries
et al., 2011; Stender et al., 2014) suggest that consciousness may
be present in patients labeled as vegetative and so trouble the
diagnostic boundaries of VS. Our argument is not that diagnosis is
inherently and invariably a bad thing: a label can be useful for
accessing resources and/or assessing outcomes, We posit however,
that there is a need to give consideration to the wider ramiﬁca-
tions and inherent tensions associated with diagnostic categories
and processes which may, in turn help us appreciate some of their
unintended and unanticipated consequences. For example, diag-
nosis may ultimately fail to quell doubt. There may be other im-
plications too. The diagnostic net could be widened with
increasing numbers of patients being kept alive, ‘just in case’ they
‘are’ conscious, regardless of what relatives, or the patients
themselves might have wanted or resources allow. These ‘high-
tech’ means that seek to resolve ambiguities harbor the potential
to introduce new complexities (Samuel and Kitzinger, 2013),
mobilize discourses of ‘hope’ and create a mirage of diagnostic
certainty which, in turn, could also facilitate a privileging of
biomedical readings of the body over competing lay, clinical or
other interpretations.
5. Conclusion
Although we have unparalleled knowledge and means to
preserve, modify and regulate human bodies, we live in an era of
unprecedented doubt as to what bodies and minds are, how we
might understand them, and how they relate to our notions of
personhood (Shilling, 2012). We live too, in an era characterized
by perpetual liminality and ambivalence, as certainties (such as
death) are conﬁgured as choices: where, when, and on whose
authority can we decide to permit death. Technological innova-
tion, in tandem with medico-legal imperatives to preserve life,
have resulted in longer survival rates, and patients variously
diagnosed as ‘comatose’, or in ‘unresponsive wakefulness syn-
drome’, ‘persistent vegetative’, ‘permanent vegetative’, and
‘minimally conscious’ states with each label carrying varying
possibilities. From an analysis of medical literatures, in tandem
with interview data interpreted with the help of Bauman's thesis
on ambivalence and Turner's work on liminality, we tentatively
propose the notion of a diagnostic illusory: the idea that this
modernist urge to classify and name may serve to exacerbate (or
at the very least fail to address) the existential challenges faced
by relatives and carers and, moreover, raise hopes and expecta-
tions of clarity which may be unfulﬁlled. While a deﬁnitive
diagnosis may be useful for relatives and health care staff to
improve prognostic accuracy and secure resources (such as
rehabilitation for MCS patients) or particular outcomes (such as
withdrawal of ANH for PVS patients) it seems unlikely that it
could address the ‘ambiguity and search for meaning’ (Comaroff
and Maguire, 1981: 115). Although we have generated the
concept of diagnostic illusory from a case study of CDoCs we
hypothesis that the concept may be generalizable to other con-
ditions and settings not least because disease and diagnostic
boundaries are ever more ﬂuid and permeable with the conver-
gence of risk and disease (Aronowitz, 2009). Moreover, from the
lessons learned here we would caution against an elision of the
biomedical gaze with a neuro-technological imperative that
through the recourse to popular discourses on neurobiology,
offer hope and increased expectations (Borup et al., 2006) that
consciousness exists within the depths of the brain and we will
in the future be able to unambiguously identify it. Whilst there is
no doubt that a diagnosis of MCS or VS can bring relief for rel-
atives and possibly (but who can know) for patients it is unlikely
to fully ever extinguish ambivalence and doubt. In this regard
diagnoses can comprise a mirage of certainty we call diagnostic
illusory.
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